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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I. DEFI NION OF TEms
A. "Change in Condition"
In Causby . Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Go.' the claim-
ant was awarded compensation as the result of a compensable
injury. Thereafter she applied, through new counsel, for review
of the award on a change-in condition under the following pro-
vision of the Workmen's Compensation Law:
Upon its own motion or upon the application of any party
in interest on the ground of a change in condition, the Com-
mission may review any award and on such review may
make an award ending, diminishing or increasing the com-
pensation previously awarded, subject to the maximum or
minimum provided in this Title .... 2
The hearing commissioner, finding as a fact that the claimant
had sustained a change in condition for the worse, made a fur-
ther award. The circuit court reversed, holding that the award
was without evidentiary support. The South Carolina Supreme
Court in Cromer V. Newberpy Cotton MNSls 3 had held that a
"change in condition" meant a change in the physical condition
of the claimant as a result of the original injury, occurring after
the first award. In the instant case the court, in affirming the
lower court, distinguished an appeal under section 72-359 of the
Code from an appeal from the original award, and found that
under the former the claimant must show that the condition
which arose as a result of the original injury had worsened. The
court held that a condition which continues, or remains at the
same degree of disability, cannot be appealed as a change in
condition under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
B. "Accident"
In Pellum v. W. C. Chaplin Transport,4 the hearing examiner
and the full Industrial Commission had found that the employee,
a truck driver for the defendant, had suffered a fatal heart
attack caused by an accident arising out of his employment as
1. 249 S.C. 225, 153 S.E2d 697 (1967).
2. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 72-359 (1962).
3. 201 S.C. 349, 23 S.E2d 19 (1942).
4. 154 S.E.2d 432 (S.C. 1967).
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contemplated by the Workmen's Compensation Law.5 The circuit
court reversed and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that work for prolonged hours over a period of time does
not constitute an accident under the statute. The court stated that
if a heart attack results as a consequence of the ordinary
exertion that is required in the performance of the duties of
the employment in the ordinary and usual manner, and
without any outward untoward event, it is not compensable
as an accident. The fact that due to a weakened heart con-
dition, the exertion required for the ordinary performance
of the work is too great for the particular employee, who
undertakes to perform it, does not make it a compensable
accident. 6
In the instant case the claimant's decedent, having a history of
heart illness, worked long hours in delivering fuel oil during
the winter months. The court felt that it was normal for fuel
oil deliverymen to work long hours during winter when fuel was
in heavy demand.
II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREmENTS
In Chapman v. Foremost Dairies, Inc.7 the employee suffered
a fall that produced a hematoma which became infected, pro-
ducing an abscess. The circuit court reversed a compensation
award, but the supreme court found error in the reversal and
affirmed the award.
The basis of the defendant's appeal was an objection that the
claimant's action was barred by the one-year limitation in the
Workmen's Compensation Law. The statute requires that writ-
ten notice of the claim be filed with the Commission within one
year after the accident.3 The claimant was injured on June 23,
1961, and made timely notice to his supervisor of the injury;
however, it was not until April 27, 1963, that the claimant had
to stop work and seek medical attention.
The supreme court found that the defendant notified the
claimant by mail that it was denying his claim because in its
opinion, he had not sustained an accident arising out of and
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-14 (1962).
6. Pellum v. W. C. Chaplin Transport, 154 S.E2d 432 (S.C. 1967), quoting
from Walsh v. U.S. Rubber Co., 238 S.C. 411, 418, 120 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1961).
7. 154 S.E.2d 845 (S.C. 1967).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-303 (1962).
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during the course of his employment. The hearing commissioner
refused to allow the defendant, at the hearing, to assert the
additional defense of the statute of limitation since it was
omitted from the letter of denial of liability, written pursuant
to the rules of the Industrial Commission." The court agreed
with the Commission and the lower court that the claim, not
being filed within the requisite one-year period, was barred by
the statute of limitations, but that the defendant must raise the
issue in the required letter from the employer to the employee
prior to the hearing.'0 The court held that the one-year limita-
tion was waived, and the employer and carrier were estopped
from asserting it.
III. STATUTORY CoNsTucTIoN
Dunmore v. Brooks Veneer Company"1 raised the issue of the
definition of the term "leg" in the Workmen's Compensation
Law.- 2 The claimant sustained a compensable crushing injury
to the ankle. The limb was surgically amputated at a point
about six and one-half inches below the knee so that it could
better be fitted with a prosthesis. The Industrial Commission
found that the claimant had suffered a specific loss of one hun-
dred percent of his leg, and awarded compensation accordingly.
On appeal by the employer to the circuit court, the award of the
Commission was affirmed.
The employer appealed on the ground that the claimant had
suffered the loss of a foot and not one hundred percent use of
his leg, and that the removal of a portion of the leg between the
knee and ankle was a surgical necessity referred to medically as
having been performed at the "site of election."
The South Carolina Supreme Court was faced with an inter-
pretation of Section 72-163 of the South Carolina Code which
9. Industrial Commission Rules and Regulations, R. 18; S.C. CoDE ANN.
Vol. 17, p. 320 (1962).
10. See, e.g., Hoke v. Cherokee County, 216 S.C. 376, 58 S.E.2d 330 (1950).
11. 248 S.C. 326, 149 S.E2d 766 (1966).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-153 (1962), the pertinent parts of which read:
When disability deemed to continue for certain periods; disfigurement;
comPensation. In cases included in the following schedule, the disability
in each case shall be deemed to continue for the period specified and the
compensation so paid for such injury shall be as specified therein, to wit:
(14) For the loss of a foot, sixty per cent of the average weekly
wages during one hundred and twenty-five weeks; (15) For the loss of
a leg, sixty per cent of the average weekly wages during one hundred
and seventy-five weeks; . . . (18) Total loss of use of a member or loss
of vision of an eye shall be considered as equivalent to the loss of such
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is patently unambiguous, but under which the Industrial Com-
mission had, for many years, awarded compensation for one
hundred percent loss of the leg where the amputation was above
the ankle joint. Although recognizing that the court in Etiwan
Fertilizer Company v. South Carolina Tax Commission'8 held
that a uniform construction of a statute by an administrative
body over a long period of years, acquiesced in by the General
Assembly, is entitled to weight and should not be overruled
without cogent reason; the court held:
This sound principle may not be invoked to perpetuate a
palpably erroneous application of an unambiguous statute
which, in this respect, requires no construction, and which
the commission and the courts are obligated to en-
force. 14
The supreme court reversed, delineating its construction in a
footnote:
We unhesitatingly conclude that the word leg in our Work-
men's Compensation Act refers to lower limb of the body
including the thigh, even though in the nomenclature of
anatomy it bears the restricted meaning of lower leg as
distinguished from thigh. Otherwise, a mid-thigh amputa-
tion would not be compensable as a specific loss.1 5
IV. COVERAGE UNDER THE CODE
A. Status as Employee or Partner
Marlow v. E. L. Jones & Son, Inc.16 was concerned with the
problem of the coverage of the claimant under the Workmen's
Compensation Law. The claimant, with two others, was a textile
worker who "moonlighted" as a roofer for a contractor, being
paid a certain sum for each square of shingles applied to the
contractor's buildings. The three roofers guaranteed their work
and, on receiving any complaint, made inspections and repairs
without charge. The claimant was injured while making an in-
spection of a previously installed roof.
On prosecution of his claim against the contractor, the hearing
examiner found that the claimant was not an employee, but
13. 217 S.C. 354, 60 S.E.2d 682 (1950).
14. Dunnore v. Brooks Veneer Co., 248 S.C. 326, 333, 149 S.E.2d 766, 769
(1966).
15. Id. at 767, n.1.
16. 248 S.C. 568, 151 S.E.2d 747 (1966).
4
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rather, was an independent contractor. On appeal the full com-
mission reversed, holding that the claimant was an employee of
a sub-contractor of the contracting firm. The circuit court
affirmed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court placed this case squarely
within the rule of McDowel Uv. Stilley Plywood Co.17 which held
that the Workmen's Compensation Law' s does not include a
subcontractor or independent contractor, but only their em-
ployees; and that this claimant, with two others, were equal
partners. On a finding that the claimant was not an employee of
either or both of his associates, but enjoyed the status of a part-
ner, the court was able to dismiss the claim without considering
whether the claimant's injury was sustained in the performance
of work undertaken by the contractor.
B. Coverage Based on Situs
Arant v. First Southern Compay 19 was concerned with cov-
erage for foreign injuries under the Workmen's Compensation
Law.20 The employee was injured in an accident in Tennessee
after being hired in North Carolina to perform duties largely
in South Carolina. The key question on appeal was whether the
Industrial Commission had jurisdiction under the Law, which
provides:
When an accident happens while an employee is employed
elsewhere than in this State which would entitle him or his
dependents to compensation if it had happened in this State,
the employee or his dependents shall be entitled to compen-
sation, if (a) the contract of employment was made in this
State, (b) the employer's place of business is in this State
and (c) the residence of the employee is in this State; pro-
vided the contract of employment was not expressly for
service exclusively outside the State .... 21
17. 210 S.C. 173, 41 S.E2d 872 (1947).
18. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 72-112 (1962). "Liability of contractor to workmen
of subcontractor.-When any person . . . referred to as 'contractor,' contracts
to perform or execute any work for another person which is not a part of the
trade, business or occupation of such other person and contracts with any other
person . . . for the execution or performance by or under the subcontractor of
the whole or any of the work undertaken by such contractor, the contractor
shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensation
under this Title which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had
been immediately employed by him."
19. 249 S.C. 305, 153 S.E2d 919 (1967).
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The South Carolina Supreme Court has construed this section as
having four prerequisites to the Industrial Commission's having
jurisdiction of a claim arising out of an out-of-state accident.22
The supreme court determined that the first requisite, requiring
that the contract of employment was made in this state, was -not
met and disposed of this case without going into any of the other
requisites. The court held that the Industrial Commission was
without jurisdiction.
£. EmpZoyer's Election of Coverage
In Marsh v. Leo's, Ine,.23 the court was concerned with a case
in which the full Commission had reversed an award of the
hearing commissioner and had dismissed a claim on finding that
the employer had fewer than fifteen employees as specified in
the Workmen's Compensation Law24 and had not elected to be
covered by the Act.25 An insurance agent applied for a policy
as a means of obtaining a rate quotation for the employer, and
the issuing company filed the policy with the Industrial Com-
mission. The policy was not accepted by the employer.
A person exempted from the mandatory provision of the
Workmen's Compensation Law may come in under its terms by
filing a written notice of his desire to do so with the Industrial
Commission.26 The court, in White v. J. T. Strahan Co.2 7 had
held that substantial compliance with this section was sufficient
to bring an employer under the Act.
The supreme court, in affirming, found that the employer
here did nothing which had any tendency to indicate that he
intended to come in under the terms of the Act.
22. See, e.g., Price v. Horton Motor Lines, 201 S.C. 484, 23 S.E.2d 744
(1942) and Younginer v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 215 S.C. 135, 54 S.E.2d 545
1949), which together list the four prerequisites as follows:
(1) The contract of employment must have been made in South Carolina.
(2) The employer's place of business must have been in South Carolina.
(3) The residence of the employee must have been in this State.
(4) The contract of employment must have been for services to be per-
formed not exclusively outside of this State.
23. 249 S.C. 45, 152 S.E.2d 352 (1967).
24. S.C. CODE ANx. § 72-107 (1962), the pertinent parts of which read:
Casual employees and other excepted employments. . . . This Title shall
apply to: ...
(2) Any person that has regularly employed in service less than fifteen
employees in the same business within this State; ....
25. S.C. CODE AN . § 72-109 (1962).
26. Id.
27. 244 S.C. 120, 135 S.E.2d 720 (1964).
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A. The Fact Finding Authority of the Commission
Two cases were concerned with the inherent right of the In-
dustrial Commission to determine the facts without infringe-
ment on appeal. In Couch v. Greenville County2 8 the claimant
was a deputy sheriff with a prior history of heart disease who
suffered an aggravation of his heart condition as a result of
being told of complaints made against him by citizens of the
county. The employer defended on the ground that (1) notice
of the injury was not given to the employer within the required
thirty days, 29 (2) the claim was barred by a release signed by
the claimant, and (3) the claimant had not sustained an injury
by accident in the course of his employment3 0
The hearing commissioner made an award to the claimant on
the holding that notice of the injury was properly given and
that the claimant suffered a heart attack while investigating a
rape case. No ruling was made in regard to the claim being
barred by a release signed by the claimant.
On appeal to the full Commission the award was affirmed,
the Commission holding that the injury was caused by a severe
emotional disturbance as the result of a reprimand by his em-
ployer. The Commission also failed to pass on the effect of the
release. On appeal to the circuit court, the case was remanded to
the commission for the purpose of passing on all questions
raised.
The supreme court held that the Commission, in finding dif-
ferently from the hearing commissioner as to the cause of the
accident, had involved itself in the merits of the case; thus, the
supreme court limited itself to a determination that the -full
Commission had properly determined that the claimant had
sustained a compensable accident, and that the issue of the
claimant's release was not properly before the circuit court, as
this concerned the merits of the claim. The supreme court was
therefore able to reverse the order of remand and affirm the
award of the Industrial Commission.
28. 249 S.C. 186, 153 S.E2d 394 (1967).
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-301 (1962).
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-14 (1962), the pertinent parts of which read:
Injury and personal injury.-"Injury" and "personal injury" shall mean
only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employ-
ment and shall not include a disease in any form, except when it results
naturally and unavoidably from the accident and except such diseases as
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Bundrick v. Powell's Garage & Wrecker Service31 concerned
a claimant who suffered a compensable injury to the arm which
rendered him unable to continue in his employment. The only
testimony offered before the commission was by the claimant
and his doctor, and by a doctor presented by the defendant. Fol-
lowing the medical testimony of both doctors and the testimony
of the claimant, the commissioner inspected the claimant's arm
and noting scars, made an award. The circuit court reversed the
Commission by stating that "although the claimant's testimony
had probative value relating to the question of whether the
claimant's right arm was disabled at all, such testimony had no
probative value in the determination of the extent to which it
was disabled." The court therefore rejected the claimant's testi-
mony and held, in effect, that the issue was to be determined on
medical testimony alone.
The supreme court, however, was of the opinion that the issue
of the extent of loss of use of the claimant's arm was not so
technically complicated as to require medical testimony alone.
The court held that the lower court, in undertaking to choose
between the conflicting testimony of the two medical witnesses,
impinged upon the fact-finding function of the hearing com-
missioner.
B. Refusal to Consider Facts
Moore v. Reeves Bros.32 was concerned with a finding by the
Industrial Commission that the claimant had suffered a com-
pensable injury which required him to seek lighter work at
diminished pay, and awarded him sixty percent of the difference
between his former salary and his diminished salary. The circuit
court affirmed.
The supreme court held that the case could only be deter-
mined by a finding of fact by the Commission, and that such a
finding is conclusive.
STANL H. Kom
31. 248 S.C. 496, 151 S.E.2d 437 (1966).
32. 249 S.C. 201, 153 S.E.2d 498 (1967).
[Vol. 19
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 15
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss4/15
